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Abstract
The arguably dominant approaches to the study of interfirm relations are the
capabilities and organizational economics perspectives.  This paper discusses
their merits and weaknesses, concentrating on the capabilities perspective,
which is argued to rest on rather weak foundations, particularly as a theory of
economic organization (including interfirm relations).  However, it is
suggested that both perspectives may be seen as part of an overarching
bargaining approach to economic organization (yet to be developed).  Both
perspectives have identified impediments to efficient bargaining.
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1I. Introduction
I am not an expert on inter-firm arrangements, and my perspective will therefore to a large
extent be that of an outsider to the field.  More specifically, I shall bring some broad ideas
from the theory of the firm field and, to a smaller extent, the firm strategy field to bear on
issues relating to inter-firm arrangements.  My discussion will be rather ”meta”, and I shall
not present anything resembling a model; instead I shall be concerned with basic insights
and with research heuristics and methods.
A starting point for my discussion is to note that the perhaps dominant theoretical approach
to the study of inter-firm relations, if there is one, is a bouillabaise consisting of numerous
ingredients of which transactions costs and capabilities are the most clearly visible parts,
but in which other ingredients certainly also flow around (e.g., Nooteboom 1999).   I am
not a bouillabaise expert either, but an examination of the literature reveals that the inter-
firm bouillabaise is one that is often cooked on the basis of ingredients of which we have
little knowledge, these ingredients are combined in ways that are not always transparent
(i.e., the recipes are not clearly stated), and we have very little knowledge about how the
ingredients – notably, capabilities and transaction costs - interact.  Care in the enjoyment of
this particular diet is therefore recommended.
Now, what are these ingredients and recipes that we don’t really understand?  With respect
to the recipe part, it has sometimes been argued that one can follow either a “transaction
value” recipe to the study of inter-firm organizations or an “transaction cost” recipe.1 A
number of writers associated with the capabilities/resource-based approach have made this
basic distinction.  Moreover, they have argued that it is a fundamental one -- not only in the
study of inter-firm relations, but in the theory of economic organization more generally
(e.g., Conner 1991; Zajac and Olsen 1993; Madhok and Tallman 1998).  In fact, it is taken
to be the distinction that separates capabilities approaches from economic organization
approaches, such as the transaction cost approach. However, I shall argue that the
distinction between transaction cost and transaction value does not really stand up to
scutiny.  Hence, the “confusion” part of the title of this paper.
Rather than adding to the confusion by stressing spurious distinctions, basic theoretical
research should aim at more fully integrating insights with insights from the capabilities
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 And also corresponding to the distinction between “production approaches” and “exchange approaches” that
one may encounter in some of the farther corners of the literature.
2approach.  To be sure, others have said this before me.   However, in this case, as in so
many other cases, talk is cheap; “saying” is much more easy than “doing”.    And so far,
very little real integration has actually taken place.  A fundamental reason why integrative
efforts are bound to be severely handicapped for a long time to come is that a crucial
ingredient in the inter-firm bouillabaise − namely, that of capabilities − is in actuality a
cover for our ignorance.  Frankly, we don’t really know what capabilities really are,
although I guess most of us agree that there is definitely something to the concept.  They
are black, if not empty, boxes.  As they appear in the literature, capabilities are (mostly)
aggregate concepts that may be located in firms, among firms and even in industrial
districts (as I have suggested myself, Foss and Eriksen 1995).  We are pretty much in the
dark about how they relate to individual actions and learning, and I think that we badly
need a microfoundation for capabilities reasoning (see Foss and Foss 1999).  Thus, I shall
make a stride forward in the effort to criticize capabilities reasoning as an antidote to the
strawmen who praise it for all virtue, and I do so with a good  conscience, since I have
myself on earlier occasions indulged in a fair amount of capabilities talk (e.g. Foss 1993).
Now, there is, to be sure, considerable merit to many ideas in the capabilities approach.
And this paper should certainly not be read as an unqualified celebration of organizational
economics.  The latter body of theory does clearly neglect many phenomena that are
important to understanding inter-firm relations, not the least learning, as Oliver Williamson
(1998) has recently admitted.  The points of this paper are rather that
• although capabilities ideas are likely to be crucial for a satisfactory understanding of
inter-firm relations, work on capabilities strongly need to be equipped with firmer
theoretical foundations;
• there is no point in articificially separating capabilities and organizational economics
approaches; and
• both may be argued to have identified impediments to efficient bargaining and
contracting.  Thus, strictly speaking it does not make sense to claim that there is an
approach, namely organizational economics, which in contrast to the capabilities
approach is ”contractual”.  In actuality, they are both part of an overarching contractual
approach to inter-firm relations (yet to be developed).
3II. Some Distinctions — and  Some Confusions
A Map of the Field
Let me begin by presenting a taxonomy of sorts (inspired by Sid Winter 1988) that I believe
pretty accurately captures how many scholars that do economics-oriented (or at least,
economics-inspired) work on inter-firm relations themselves perceive of their field (Table
1).
TABLE
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 A map of economics-oriented work on inter-firm relations
                                                   Rationality viewed as…
Bounded Perfect
Production (given
capabilities)
Richardson (1972) NIO work on,
e.g., production
joint ventures
Learning about
production
Langlois (1992),
Amendola &
Gaffard (1994),
Lundvall (1992),
Arino & de la
Torre (1998),
Nooteboom
(1999), Zajac and
Olsen (1993)
Real options
approaches to
inter-firm
relations (e.g.,
Kogut 1991)
Structuring deals
between firms
Williamson
(1991), Teece
(1986)
Incomplete
contracts work
Focal
Con-
cern
“Trans
action
value”
“Trans
action
cost” Learning about
the structuring of
deals
Nooteboom
(1999), Langlois
(1992), the IMP
approach  (e.g.,
Johansson and
Mattson 1987)
Balakrishnan and
Koza (1993)
4As we all know the scholarly community that works on inter-firm relations is extremely
broad-ranging, encompassing, for example, management scholars, economic geographers
and new industrial organization economists, in addition to transaction cost and capabilities
theorists.  Needless to say, they study inter-firm  relations with different approaches and for
different purposes.  Thus, the taxonomy probably leaves something out, for example,
economic geographers would probably like to have the dimension of space added to the
taxonomy.  And some – but only a few — scholars might reject the taxonomy.   Thus, I
shall take it as coming close to how the field (simply defined as those who study inter-firm
relations) conceives of itself.
Given this, let me say a few words about the taxonomy. There are three dimensions to it —
namely, a transaction value/production and transaction cost/exchange dimension, a bounded
rationality—full rationality dimension and a statics—dynamics dimension.  These
distinctions relate to the distinctions that you will often encounter in the literature between
capabilities and organizational economics approaches to inter-firm arrangements,
particularly from those who are positively biased towards the capabilities approach (e.g.,
Nooteboom 1993; Zajac and Olsen 1993; Madhok 1996; Tallman and Madhok 1998).
Table 2 summarizes these distinctions, or, perhaps rather, partial charicatures.
5TABLE 2
A partial charicature of theories applied in inter-firm research
“The Capabilities Approach” “Organizational Economics”
• “Production oriented”.
• “Transaction value”.
• “Knowledge building and
knowledge utilization”.
• “Exchange oriented”.
• “Transaction costs”.
• Structuring incentives and
allocating property rights.
• Routines or capabilities are units
of analysis
• Transactions are units of analysis
• Differential cognition. • Cognitive homogeneity.
• Opportunism and other incentive
conflicts relatively unimportant.
• Incentive conflicts are center
stage.
• Dynamic/evolutionary. • Comparative static.
• Application to inter-firm
relations: Taken up with
analyzing how firms may develop
synergistic effects in inter-firm
relations.
• Application to inter-firm
relations: Taken up with
analyzing the structuring of deals
between firms.
In the following, I shall discuss the soundness of some of these, often made, distinctions.
Production and Exchange
The perhaps most basic distinction is that between production and exchange oriented
approaches − a distinction that was probably first applied in the context of economic
organization by Sidney Winter (1988) in a carefully guarded discussion.  Indeed, it is
necessary to exercise great care when invoking this distinction.  This is because from a
basic economic perspective, it may be difficult to see what is the big deal about this
distinction.2
One should think that ultimately efficient economic organization is the one that maximizes
joint surplus, given sharing rules, path-dependencies, information asymmetries and risk
preferences.  Clearly, production – relating to the size of the surplus —as well as exchange
—relating to the sharing of the surplus — are both crucial elements of the process, so that
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  This critique is directed not only at capabilities theorists, but also at organizational economists who have
often invoked the distinction for heuristic reasons (e.g. Williamson 1985) (Langlois and Foss 1999;
Milgrom and Roberts 1990).
6the often-invoked distinction is a misleading one.   Strictly speaking, it it thus not true that,
for example, the transaction cost approach neglects transaction benefits (as, e.g., Zajac and
Olsen 1993 assert).3   (More about this very soon).
Of course, we can conceptually make a distinction between production knowledge and
organization knowledge, between knowledge about how to do things and knowledge about
how to organize the “doing”.   However, as Nelson and Winter (1982) point out in their
classic work in actuality these bodies of knowledge are completely “intertwined”.  And that
is exactly the point.  Consider the notion of a “productive routine”.  Although this notion is
often taken as the very hallmark of a “production-oriented” approach to economic
organization, in actuality a routine is an organizational device that integrates dispersed
knowledge.  It may be given an information cost interpretation and certainly also an
incentive-alignment interpretation, namely, as an implicit contract4 (Baker, Gibbons and
Murphy 1997; Foss and Foss 1999).   So what is really the point of insisting on a sharp
distinction?
Cost and Value
A distinction which is very closely related to the exchange/production distinction is the
distinction between “transaction value” perspectives and “transaction cost” perspectives on
economic organization, including inter-firm arrangements.  It is the management equivalent
to the economics distinction between production and exchange, and has been put forward
by Conner (1991), Zajac and Olsen (1993), Madhok (1996), Madhok and Tallman (1998),
and Pitelis and Pseiridis (1999) (amongst others).
According to these writers, organizational economics represents a pure (transaction) cost
oriented perspective that does not include an analysis of the countervailing benefits in the
form of increased “value” (rents) from an inter-firm arrangement.   This is a charicature, but
charicatures usually capture something, and if the distinction is taken to mean that
organizational economics is not really taken up with analyzing firms’ positioning in the
market, or how they make positions and activities fit together (Porter 1985), then there is
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  Perhaps this sounds strange, coming from somebody who has just published (with Richard Langlois) a
paper with the title ”Capabilities and Governance: the Rebirth of Production in The Theory of Economic
Organization” (1999).  But the thrust of that paper is exactly that the separation between exchange and
production in the theory of economic organization is an artificial one.
4
   Nelson and Winter (1982) themselves stress that routines signal “organizational truces.”
7much truth to it.  But again, on the level of basic economics, it is hard to see what the fuzz
is about.
We know from the basic version of the Coase theorem that in the absence of transaction
costs and wealth-effects and supposing that all exchange opportunities will in fact be
discovered, agents will reach an efficient state, both in the Pareto sense and in the sense of
value-maximization.  Among many other things, this implies that we can separate the issue
of maximizing the value of production from the issue of its distribution.   Under these
conditions, how much value will be created, let’s say in a basic triad relation between a
supplier, a producer and a buyer?5  The answer is the difference between the reservation
price of the buyer and the opportunity cost of the supplier (for generalization, see
Brandenburger and Stuart 1996).
Of course, such an abstract answer says nothing about the actual prices that determine how
the surplus is allocated – these will be determined through bargaining.  What we do know is
that since the bargaining in the setting considered here is efficient, value will be
maximized.   Of course, in more realistic settings, there will be all sorts of impediments to
efficient bargaining (and contracting), as both game theoretical bargaining theory and
organizational economics more broadly inform us about.  What is the nature of these
impediments?
We can of course begin by rounding up all the usual suspects, such as delay costs, wealth
effects, and incomplete information, if we consider it from the point of modern bargaining
theory and information economics.  From a new institutional economics point of view,
many of these impediments are captured by the concept of transaction costs.
The point I wish to concentrate on in the following is that the two theoretical approaches
under consideration here − organizational economics and the capabilities approach − focus
on different impediments to efficient bargaining (and contracting).  Accordingly, they also
tend to focus differently on inter-firm relations. The impediments that are central in
organizational economics, for example, in Williamson’s transaction cost approach, are
well-known: They relate to the sources of misallocations introduced by the potential
presence of opportunism and bounded rationality in an inter-firm relations.6
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  Note that I refrain from talking about a supplier, a producer and a buyer firm, since in this setting  there may
be no firms (because of the zero transaction cost assumption).
6
 It should be noted that some parts of organizational economics do not assume inefficient bargaining.  For
example, in the incomplete contracts approach, ex post bargaining is taken to be efficient.
8However, the impediments to efficient bargaining introduced by the capabilities perspective
are not well-known and not so immediately given to interpretation in terms of contract
theory. As I see it, they relate more to the various cognitive issues that are not easily
captured by the standard asymmetric information paradigm. I reserve this for later
discussion, however.
III. Organizational Economics
There can of course be very little doubt that organizational economics, and particularly the
transaction cost framework, has been, and continues to be, extremely influential in the
study of inter-firm relations. Indeed, it is arguably the dominant framework in the field —
although one of the reasons why the capabilities approach has become important is that it
appears to remedy some of the deficiencies and anomalies that the transaction cost
approach has with respect to treating inter-firm relations.
Trust
In the eyes of the critics there have been many such deficiencies and anomalies.  The time-
honoured complaint is, of course, that transaction cost economics neglects trust. The trust
issue was almost from the beginning something of a red herring, and, to stay with
metaphor, it is seems to me to be flogging a dead horse to still insist that transaction cost
economics ”neglects trust”.  Strictly speaking, it does not.
Apart from Williamson’s own recent work (e.g., Williamson 1991), and other recent work
in organizational economics (e.g., Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1997) an example is
provided by Bart Nooteboom’s recent book, Inter-Firm Alliances: Analysis and Design
(1999), which the author himself describes as ”dynamic transaction cost economics”7 and
which is very much taken up with discussing trust and integrating various notions of trust
with basic TCE arguments.  So trust is far from being neglected.   However, it must be
conceded that the transaction cost approach — and certainly its close formal cousin, the
incomplete contracts approach — tend to neglect the extent to which implicit contracts may
substitute for ownership in protecting specific assets.  Of course, subcontracting
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 More precisely, it is an eclectic blend of ideas from ”old” institutionalism, psychological research,  the
capabilities approach and transaction cost economics (the latter remains the main ingredient, though).
9relationships in Japanese business is the classic example of this.8 This is where those who
insist that trust is still an issue may perhaps have a case.
Transaction Cost Economics is Relatively Aggregative
Let me return to Nooteboom’s book for a moment.  That book does indeed bring out,
though implicitly, some of the difficulties involved in applying the transaction cost
framework to the study of inter-firm relations.  Notably, those who use transaction cost
ideas for this purpose seldom use only these ideas; they normally piece together their own
toolbox, in which transaction cost economics is surely an important instrument but seldom
the only one. (One might add that these electic exercises rarely go beyond loosely
combining diverse insights; there is little theoretical development).   There are many
reasons for this.
The first reason may be that the transaction cost approach as developed by Oliver
Williamson is in actuality a relative aggregative approach for studying economic
organization, although it is often marketed differently and although it admittedly takes a
nano-economic starting point, namely in the transaction.  For example, it is not terribly well
suited for studying detailed matters of internal organization. The same may be true with
respect to inter-firm relations.  Putting all these in the portmanteau category of “hybrids”
may only be helpful on the most abstract of levels.  In actuality, much microeconomic
specificity is lost.
I suspect that future inter-firm researchers who want to approach their subject, using
organizational economics, are likely to get more specificity and useful insights out of, for
example, the latest work in principal-agent theory on subjective permance measurement
(although this type of work was originally developed for the analysis of internal
organization) (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1994).  For example, repeated game models of
subjective performance assessment would seem to be nicely fitting to understanding inter-
firm relations (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1997).
Production and Related Matters
While it is not true to say that transaction cost economics neglects production (e.g., Riordan
and Williamson 1985), it is true to say that it tends to portray production in a rather stylized
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way. Specifically, there is an implicit agreement that the production function, and its
attendant assumptions, is a sound basic conceptualization of what we need to know about
production and production costs (Langlois and Foss 1999), but that it needs to be
supplemented by insights into internal governance to account for why realized production
does not appear on the production possibility frontier.  It is also true that issues of
innovation and learning – which we all know to be crucial motives behind inter-firm
alliances – are not centrally placed in the transaction cost approach or organizational
economics in general.
Finally, apart from the presence of relational contracts between firms, the transaction cost
approach (and most certainly the incomplete contracts approach) overestimate the extent to
which complementary investments lead to a change of ownership (as in Hart 1995).  Why?
Because it is not recognized that although assets may be complementary, and perhaps
highly complementary, in the Edgeworth sense, they may still be dis-similar.  This means
that managing them in one organization may in principle — and for some (ill-understood)
reason — outweigh the costs stemming from inferior investment incentives. What is the
nature of those ”counter-wailing” costs?
Well, the quick answer is that they arise because of differential capabilities across firms,
and most existing work has not really gone beyond that simple assertion.  The claim that I
shall develop in the following is that we need to understand much better 1) what we mean
by capabilities, 2) the dimensions in which capabilities differ, and 3) how differential
capabilities influence the transaction costs that firm confronts, before we can use
capabilities ideas for understanding inter-firm relations.
IV. The Richardson Puzzle
I take it as an uncontroversial proposition that although organizational economics in its
various manifestations is very helpful for helping us understand inter-firm relations, it is not
the whole story.  Specifically, organizational economics is weak on issues that relate to
learning, positioning and other issues relating to business strategy.  Arguably, the
capabilities does have more to offer here.  Therefore, numerous contributors have suggested
to include insights from the capabilities perspective.  However, as I have argued already,
the capabilities perspective is not on a par with organizational economics with to respect to
basic issues, such as clarity, the unit of analysis, the basic explanatory mechanisms, etc.  It
11
needs to be further developed.  I therefore submit that progress in the understanding of
inter-firm relations is dependent on progress in the understanding of capabilities.
“The Organisation of Industry”
Most interfirm scholars would probably agree that the  ”grandfather” paper on inter-firm
relations, and in fact on much of the present-day capabilities approach, is George
Richardson’s, ”The Organisation of Industry”, published in the Economic Journal in 1972.
At about the same time Keith Blois published “Vertical Quasi-Integration” which also
argued that economists ought to direct much more attention to inter-firm relations.
However, Richardson’s paper stands out as the one with the deeper message.   This is
because Richardson, in contrast to Blois, essentially proposed a new set of basic principles
for addressing his phenomenon, centered around the notion of firm capability, and the
dimensions of “similarity” and “complementarity”.   His analysis is summarized in table 3.
TABLE 3
Richardson’s (1972) basic framework
Complementary Closely
complementary
Similar Indeterminate (firm?) Firm
Dis-similar Market Inter-firm arrangements
 “The Organisation of Industry” is also a remarkable illustration of the virtues of simplicity
in theoretical argument: After reading it, one is left with that feeling of being provided with
something very simple, obviously correct and yet very powerful in an explanatory sense
that only the very best papers convey.   In this respect, it is very much like Coase’s 1937
paper, and one might indeed suggest that what Coase’s paper has been to the whole field of
the economics of organization, Richardson paper is to the field that is concerned with firm
capabilities.   Let us also note in passing that there is a 35 years difference in publication
dates between these two classics.  It is not surprising, therefore, that there is a strong case
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that the capabilities approach is much less mature, and might also need a 30 to 40 years
gestation period before it can blossom (cf. Williamson 1998).
The Richardson Puzzle
While Richardson’s 1972 paper makes perfect practical sense, and businessmen and other
practical persons can clearly relate to its main ideas, once you start to think of it in a
modern theoretical mode, it raises many difficult issues that still haven’t been resolved.  In
fact, if we can compare Richardson’s 1972 paper with Coase’s 1937 paper, it is quite
obvious that Richardson still needs his Williamson, as it were.   By this I mean that some of
Richardson’s key concepts, and those that are widely used by inter-firm scholars, are
basically not theoretically understood, and they are not easily operationalized.  They are
black boxes.  For this reason, it is unclear how they influence economic organization. This
is what I mean when I speak of ”the Richardson puzzle”.9
First and foremost, the Richardson puzzle is a conceptual one.  It is a matter of defining key
concepts in Richardson’s paper − concepts that are crucial in so much of contemporary
thinking on firm strategy and economic organization, including work on inter-firm
relations.  For example, what are those capabilities? Or competencies? Or core
competencies? Or dynamic capabilities?  Well, if we consult some of the intellectual
flagbearers of the capabilities approach, Giovanni Dosi and David Teece, we are told that
… a firm’s distinctive competence needs to be understood as a reflection of
distinctive organizational capabilities to coordinate and learn. By
“organizational capabilities” we mean the capabilities of an enterprise to
organize, manage, coordinate or govern sets of activities … Posed differently, a
distinctive competence is a differentiated set of skills, complementary assets,
and organization routines which together allow a firm to coordinate a particular
set of activities in a way that provides the basis for competitive advantage in a
particular market or markets.
But this is neither truly informative, nor operational.  It amounts to explaining an ill-
understood term with other ill-understood terms.
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 As you may know there is also a ”Richardson paradox” (see Foss and Loasby 1998), so why not a puzzle,
too?
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Relatedly, we would like to know what exactly is meant by capabilities, competencies, or
activities being “distinctive”, ”similar” or ”dis-similar”, or “related” or “unrelated”.
Clearly, such characteristics are important, and we can all make intuitive sense out of what
they mean − for example, in connection with the horizontal boundaries of the firm − but
what exactly do these adjectives mean when applied to capabilities (which we don’t fully
understand in the first place)?  The situation is not much better when it comes to
operationalizing these terms. First, the proportion between theoretical and empirical work
in the capabilities perspective is heavily twisted towards the theoretical side.  Second,
existing operationalizations of capabilities are not only rather few, but also − perhaps in the
nature of things − somewhat awkward.  Thus, the number of patents, publications of
research employees, etc. are widely and routinely used to proxy capabilities (not just
technological capabilities).
One reaction to all this is, of course, to note that the capabilities approach has been oversold
by its advocates and simply cannot deliver what it promises to deliver.  However, a more
positive reaction, which I favor, is to see it as presenting us with important and fertile
research opportunities.  I discuss this in the following section.
V. Understanding Capabilities
Capabilities: Black Boxes or Residual Categories?
As Claude Ménard (1994: 239) has rightly observed,
[t]he question of why firms decide ‘to make rather than to buy’, which is at the
core of the transaction cost approach, cannot be answered in a satisfactory way
without exploring the very process through which they produce goods or
services.
The “very process through which [firms] produce goods or services” is often taken to be the
domain of the capabilities approach (Langlois and Foss 1999), so what Ménard essentially
says is that organizational economics needs to be infused with capabilities ideas.  But
putting it in this way may come close to identifying the capabilities approach with what the
transaction cost approach is not - á la “capabilities mean path-dependence, differential
cognition, opportunism-independent coordination problems, etc.”.  Obviously, we need to
be more specific about what we mean by capabilities than simply making it a residual
category.
14
Actually, organizational economics and game theory offer useful ideas for putting some
conceptual meat on the capabilities skeleton.  For example, Foss and Foss (1999) offer the
exercise of reducing a number of the basic ideas in the capabilities approach to basic
insights on the efficient allocation of property rights. The purpose of this is to find out how
much of the capabilities approach may be so reduced.  In fact, we find that many
capabilities ideas can be given a sort of microfoundations by basic organizational
economics ideas.  In itself, this is hardly surprising since a large part of what we mean by
firm capabilities refer to organizational processes – to routines and direction – and we
would certainly expect to get some theoretical leverage on these matters from
organizational economics. However – and perhaps also not so surprising − we also find that
there is a significant residual left that cannot be easily reduced.  Chief among these is what
may be put under the rubric of “cognitive issues”.
Cognitive Issues
As Luigi Marengo (e.g. 1995) and Brian Loasby (1991) have continuously and forcefully
reminded us of, mainstream economics assumes cognitive homogeneity, that is, people are
assumed to classify and process information in much the same way.  In contrast, cognitive
heterogeneity is often taken to be a key ingredient in the evolutionary theory of the firm and
a main justification for the position that evolutionary economics is taken up with the
organization of knowledge rather than information (Cohendet, Llerena and Marengo 1998).
Surely there is something to the position that cognitive differences matter for economic
organization (Langlois 1992; Foss 1993), a proposition with which any student of
international business is likely to agree on.  Indeed, one is reminded of the, possibly
apochryphical, story about the Japanese supplier firm, committed to total quality, zero
defects managements, that unable to make sense of a requirement from its American buyer
of 95 % defect free deliveries sent a separately boxed batch of 5 % deliberately broken
parts and a note saying “We don’t know why you want these.”   Such differences in world-
views are almost bound to have ramifications for the structures of costs that partners in a
relation confront.  However, what is the nature and the determinants of these costs?
With respect to the issue of determinants, the Japanese supplier story is an instance of what
Nooteboom (1999) calls “cognitive distance”. As he explains, there is an optimum level of
cognitive distance, since some cognitive distance fosters learning, but too much of it
hinders communication – clearly a variant on the well-known static/dynamic efficiency
15
trade-off.  Indeed, Nooteboom regards this trade-off as the key problem in the design of
economic organization, which raises the difficult issue of how and why cognitive distance
and economic organization are related.   One possibility here is to identify the consequences
of cognitive distance with what Dick Langlois (1992) has christened “dynamic transaction
costs”.  This gives us some leverage with respect to understanding the link.
However while the idea of cognitive distance may seem to be an appealing one when it
comes to understanding and conceptualizing the idea of coordination problems between
firms that don’t turn on incentive conflicts (Foss 1993), the truth is that here again, we are
rather ignorant.  The problems are conceptual, theoretical and empirical.  For example,
what is the metric of cognitive distance? What is the underlying theory? And what do we
really know about cognitive distance, apart from anecdotes such as the one above.  To say
that cognitive distance is a manifestation of bounded rationality is not terribly helpful,
among other things because what bounded rationality means seems to be completely
dependent on the specific user of that term.   Similarly, the argument that cognitive distance
arises because firms have different routines is, while arguably correct as far as it goes, not
very helpful either: It still leaves us ignorant about the connections between routines and
cognition.
Modeling Cognitive Issues
So what should we do from a modeling point of view?  One could of course look at the
huge literature on cognitive biases (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1995), but I am not sure
this will be helpful.  This is because that literature seems to me to be taken rather
exclusively up with biases in individual decision making.  It does not really go into the
maps (whether individual or collective) through which private information is translated into
messages – which I submit is the crucial issue if we want to understand how cognition and
the boundaries of the firm, and therefore inter-firm relations, are related.
The standard assumption in economics, for example, in team theory and the mechanism
design literature, has been that these maps are constructed by some central designing
principal and are then provided to the agents.  However, we have both pragmatic and
theoretical reasons (Marengo 1995) for supposing that such maps emerge in an at least
partly spontaneous manner, and that they arise through processes that are characterized by
multiple equilibria.  Thus, we may expect the emergence of heterogeneous maps across the
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population of firms in an industry.  That much is pretty well known from recent work in
evolutionary economics (Dosi and Marengo 1994; Marengo 1995).
What maps do, and how they connect to economic organization, have been much less
treated.  First, with respect to what they do, one important thing is that they reduce
ambiguity.  A recent study by Prashant Parikh (1990) applies game theory to the study of
ambigious communication (i.e., where precise communication is (very) costly).  He is
interested in finding out how a receiver of a message may use situation-specific information
to find out what is the true interpretation of a message.   For example, message A may have
interpretations one and three while message B may have interpretations two and three.  If
the receiver knows the probabilities of the interpretations, they pay-offs that they face in the
game they play, and which message was sent, he may infer the true interpretation of the
message.  The point here is that the information on probabilities and pay-offs that allow the
receiver of a message to infer correctly is likely to be not only situation-specific, but also
organization-specific.
 “Cognitive distance” may be then interpreted as a measure of the difference between the
probabilities and pay-offs that allow an agent to make correct inferences, and the subjective
probabilities and pay-offs that a given agent holds.  The conjecture is that cognitive
distance measured in this way will typically be smaller within the firm (or at least business
unit or division) than it will be between firms (see Monteverde 1995 for evidence).
 This gives us one interpretation of what is meant by the distinction between “similar” and
“dis-similar” capabilities, which in this interpretation is simply a way of presenting the
continuous variable of cognitive distance in a discrete way.  Now, Richardson’s great
insight was to link the characteristics of capabilities to economic organization, and the
above approach suggests how this may be done: The message interpretation problems that I
have just alluded to may be impediments to efficient bargaining, and may therefore be
sources of transaction costs.   I turn to this now.
Impediments to Efficient Bargaining
Milgrom and Roberts (1990: 58) argue that “… the crucial costs associated with using
markets to carry out transactions … are the costs of bargaining over short –term
arrangements between independent economic agents”. This is in contrast to the emphasis in
transaction costs economics on asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency under
conditions of incompleteness of long-term contracts.  Their main point is that if short-term
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bargaining costs are zero, and agents are risk-neutral, hold common beliefs and have no
private information market outcomes will always be efficient,10 even in a situation
characterized by asset specificity and opportunism.   Milgrom and Roberts argue that this
points to the importance of bargaining costs for understanding economic organization, since
it is only in the presence of such costs that non-market organization can be explained.
If Milgrom and Roberts are right, this might mean that we have overinvested in the
attention paid to asset specificity and associated problems, such as, perhaps, the
establishment of long-term and relation-specific trust.  Now, what are these costs of
bargaining or impediments to efficient bargaining?  As normally understood, these include
the opportunity costs of time spent on bargaining, costs of monitoring and enforcing an
agreement, delay costs, and the costs of not reaching an agreement when efficiency requires
cooperation.  To illustrate, consider figure 1.
FIGURE 1
           Game 1                             Game 2
                                      B                            B
         x            y                                 x                   y
x             2, 2                    0,0          x           2,2                 0,0
A       A
y             0,0                     4,1                  y             0,0             4-u,1+u
Game 1 shows the strategies available to agents A and B.  The problem here is, of course,
that the Pareto criterion is too weak to select a unique equilibrium (both the (2,2) and (4,1)
outcome are equilibria). Now, obviously the (4,1) equilibrium has a higher joint surplus
than the (2,2) equilibrium, and therefore it will be in A’s interest to bribe B to play the y-
strategy.  So we can imagine bargaining between our two agents.11  If u, the bribe that they
                                                          
10
 That is, the same outcomes will be realized as in the situation where the parties could make a complete
long-term contract.
11
  Here and in the following I am deliberately overstepping the boundaries between cooperative and non-
cooperative game theory.
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reach through bargaining, lies between 1 and 2, the equilibrium corresponding to both A
and B playing y will be efficient, and, hence, be chosen.  Thus, efficiency now implies that
the agents agree on maximizing and somehow splitting the joint surplus.  In this situation a
bargaining failure occurs when bribes cannot be sustained in equilibrium, something that
may be crucially dependent on the timing of the game.12  Much of the economics of
organization, including its applications to inter-firm relations, essentially concerns how
hierarchical governance forms or forms that are intermediate between firms and markets
may remedy these failures.
Note in this example that the relevant bargaining costs refer to the costs of monitoring and
enforcing an agreement and to the possibility that trade never materializes. Indeed, this is
pretty typical of the modern economics of organization.  But there are many other
bargaining costs − related to information and communication rather than to enforcement −
that are not represented.  To see this, note in figure 1 how much we as analysts take as
given for the agents.  Such representations obscure some rather fundamental questions in
order to analyze well-defined situations.  Among these questions are, How do players come
to know the pay-offs? Or each other? Or the available strategies? Will they hold the same
views of the pay-offs? Of each other? Of the available strategies? How, do they know
which game, and type of game, they play?  When such questions are relevant to the players
of a game, I shall say that they face an “ill-structured bargaining situation”.
In the economics of organization (and in most of game theory), such situations are
suppressed by assuming from the outset that players have commonly known, identical
beliefs about all other players’ strategies, and that those beliefs are consistent with some
equilibrium in the game.   However, this may not be warranted if there is a systematic link
between economic organization and how ill-structured a bargaining situation is.
VI.  Implications for Research in Inter-firm Relations
Impediments to Bargaining
We are now in a position to take stock.  The basic problem with the economics of
organization as it applies to inter-firm relations is not really that it neglects trust or value
                                                          
12
 For example, if A gives B the bribe before the game begins, B will not choose the y-strategy, which means
that A will decide not to give B any bribe. Or, A may promise B to pay the bribe after game, but B will
realize that this will not be in A’s interest, and will still choose the x-strategy.  Although the (2,2)
equilibrium is still efficient, it is not joint-surplus maximizing.
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(since neither is really neglected).  Rather, it is that cognitive bargaining costs are assumed
away, because all bargaining situations are taken to be well-structured.  To be sure, firms in
an inter-firm relation are legally independent entities that are engaged in a continuous
bargaining game over the surplus from the relation.   Some of the costs of these bargaining
activities are surely (variable) enforcement and monitoring costs (Baker, Gibbons and
Murphy 1994), and various (fixed and sunk) costs associated with setting up a specialized
governance structure (Williamson 1996).
 However, before firms can actually bargaining over the division of the surplus from the
relation, they need to have overcome cognitive bargaining costs, that is, the costs related to
making demands (including product specifications, delivery times, technological
specifications, etc.) in a bargaining game understandable to the other party.  In other words,
the parties have to understand and set up the bargaining game they are engaged in.
We may think of this in terms of basic game theory.  Consider figure 2, which portrays two
prisoners’ dilemma games nested in a coordination game.
FIGURE 2
                                                                            B
             a           b       c             d
 a        4,4             1,5         0,0         0,0
b        5,1              2,2         0,0        0,0
A
c        0,0              0,0         4,4        1,5
d        0,0              0,0         5,1        2,2
Intuitively, the players have to solve the coordination problem first, before they can play
the PD games.  By analogy, in an interfirm relation, firms have to understand the basic
structure of the game(s) they will play – that is, reduce cognitive distance -- before they can
actually start playing.   It is this part of the problem that so far has received very little
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attention in the theory of economic organization.  However, it is likely to be important in
the context of interfirm relations involving firms with different routines, capabilities, etc.
Economic Organization and Competitive Advantage
The activity of reducing cognitive impediments to bargaining involves sunk costs, but may
result in the creation of assets (and in some cases liabilities) – namely, relation-specific
“codes” (Arrow 1974) – that ease interaction.  They may be sources of value creation.
Fundamentally, this is because they allow the parties to discover opportunities that they
otherwise may not have discovered, both with respect to exploiting the possibilities of
combining their existing resources and with respect to exploiting new possibilities for
resource combination.
However, there is the further dimension to it that the reduction of cognitive impediments to
bargaining are likely to interact in non-trivial ways with other impediments to bargaining.
For example, the reduction of cognitive impediments may help the parties to reduce those
impediments to bargaining that exist even within well-structured bargaining situations (i.e.,
opportunism, moral hazard, etc.).  On the other hand, the reduction of opportunism, etc.
also allows the parties to invest more in relation-specific codes.  In other words, investing
in overcoming cognitive impediments to bargaining and investing in overcoming
opportunism-related impediments to bargaining may be complementary activities in the
Edgeworth sense.
We are dealing here with sources of not only value-creation, but also of sustained
competitive advantage.  In fact, the establishment of codes between firms and the complex
interaction between reducing opportunism and reducing distance may satisfy all the four
standard criteria of the ”cornerstones of competitive advantage” (Peteraf 1993), namely,
they 1) are sources of heterogeneity, 2) may be subject to ex ante barriers to competition in
factor markets and 3) to ex post barriers to competition, and 4) they may be immobile.
Thus, the analysis all too briefly sketched out here has implications not only for economic
organization, but also for the understanding of competitive advantage.
VI. Conclusion
More than anything, this paper has been a call for more integrative work and a dialogue
between capabilities theorists and organizational economists that transcends a dialogue of
the deafs.   More specifically, I have argued that
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• We don’t really know what capabilities are. Specifically, the capabilities approach
works off very good ideas − and is arguably necessary for the full understanding of
inter-firm relations − but it badly needs to be strengthened in the theoretical dimensions.
• I have suggested that existing ideas in game theory and the economics of organization
may be helpful for conceptualizing and understanding basic aspects of capabilities, but
that there is (probably) more to capabilities than can be captured by the mainstream
paradigm.
• In the context of economic organization, one way to approach the capabilities approach
is to see it as part of an overarching bargaining approach (yet to be developed), where
the capabilities approach have identified non-standard bargaining costs, more
specifically cognitive costs related to making sense of/constructing the bargaining
game.  Economizing with such costs may explain important aspects of economic
organization in general, and inter-firm relations in particular.
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